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Abstract 
Political scientists might hope to offer practitioners involved in debates about electoral reform insights 
regarding either the process of reform or its potential effects. In respect of each of these, the 
practitioners whom we engage might by either elite decision-makers or the activists, journalists, and 
regular citizens who constitute the bedrock of democracy. The UK’s electoral reform referendum of 
2011 offers a good opportunity to explore the degree to which political scientists in fact offer original 
insights in these various areas. The paper argues that, despite the great efforts that political scientists 
have expended in refining ever more sophisticated models of electoral system effects, elite 
practitioners have often – though not always – got there before us. By contrast, at least in the UK, 
practitioners sometimes fall short of political scientists in their understanding of how reform 
processes might unfold, and there is also a clear and strong need for political scientists to assist in 
educating public opinion. These findings have implications for how we should think about political 
science research: the research that practitioners most value is often not the research that has the 
highest prestige within the discipline. 
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The question asked by the editors of this symposium is both important and intriguing. It is important 
because political scientists need to attend to the issue of how our research adds usefully to the sum 
of human knowledge. Practitioners sometimes suspect us of work that is overly abstract or theoretical 
and that therefore fails to deliver fresh knowledge with clear practical implications. Some 
practitioners, critical of political science’s value, have even sought to impede that work, as when, in 
2013, National Science Foundation funding for political science research in the United States was 
severely restricted. Clarifying the utility of our work therefore matters. Yet the question is also 
intriguing because it is not immediately obvious what our answer should be: in the realm of electoral 
systems, savvy practitioners often know just as much as we do. 
I shall explore these issues through the example of the UK’s referendum in May 2011 on whether to 
change the electoral system from the traditional first past the post (FPTP) system to the alternative 
vote (AV). I participated in the referendum campaign as an impartial expert: I wrote a book – A Citizen’s 
Guide to Electoral Reform – which set out the issues raised by the referendum for the lay reader; 
subsequently, I also authored a briefing paper on the subject for the UK Political Studies Association, 
which was downloaded over 22,000 times during the campaign and used widely by journalists and 
others. I shall comment on what, in my perception, these interventions contributed. In order to avoid 
the danger of selection bias, I shall look at other stages in the referendum process as well, and I shall 
supplement my reflections on the 2011 referendum with analysis of electoral reform debates in the 
UK more widely. 
I will argue that our endeavours can add original knowledge, but not always in the ways that have 
highest prestige within political science. I will suggest that this has implications for what our own 
priorities should be. 
 
The Case: The UK Electoral Reform Referendum of 2011 
Voters across the UK went to the polls on 5 May 2011 to answer the following question:  
At present, the UK uses the “first past the post” system to elect MPs to the House of Commons. 
Should the “alternative vote” system be used instead? (Electoral Commission 2011: 4) 
The vote thus pitted first past the post (FPTP) – the electoral system that has been used to fill all seats 
in the UK House of Commons since 1950 (and the vast majority of seats for much longer) – against 
another majoritarian electoral system using single-member districts: the alternative vote (AV) system, 
also known as preferential voting (PV) or instant runoff voting (IRV). 
The referendum was called immediately after the general election of 2010. By way of context, Table 
1 shows the results of that election in terms of both seats and votes, showing the extent to which each 
party gained or lost from the electoral system’s disproportionality. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
During the campaign preceding the 2010 election, the Labour Party had advocated a referendum on 
introducing AV (Labour Party 2010: 9:3), while the Conservatives supported the status quo 
(Conservative Party 2010: 67), and the smaller Liberal Democrats campaigned for the introduction of 
proportional representation (PR) (Liberal Democrats 2010: 87–8). The election gave no party an overall 
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majority, and subsequent negotiations led to a coalition government comprising the Conservatives 
and Liberal Democrats. Yet it was Labour’s policy – a referendum on AV – that the coalition agreement 
endorsed. This was a compromise: the Liberal Democrats were adamant on securing progress towards 
electoral reform; a referendum on AV was the most the Conservatives would accept. 
Early polls suggested widespread public sympathy for the idea of electoral reform (Qvortrup 2012: 
114). But AV’s initial lead subsequently declined. In the end, with turnout of 42.2 per cent, 32.1 per 
cent of voters supported change, while 67.9 per cent voted to retain the status quo (Electoral 
Commission 2011: 4–5). Thus, the idea of electoral reform was thrown decisively off the political 
agenda. 
Research by political scientists might have contributed to this reform debate in either of two ways: by 
delivering insights into the process of electoral reform; or by informing understandings of the putative 
reform’s likely effects. We can also subdivide possible contributions by their audience: whether the 
politicians and others at the heart of the elite-level decision-making processes relating to the 
referendum; or the activists, journalists, and regular citizens who took part in the public campaign and 
the popular vote. 
My own contribution related to the second element on each of these dimensions: it concerned the 
likely effects of the proposed reform; and it was directed at journalists and members of the public. It 
comprised two primary elements. First, my book, A Citizen’s Guide to Electoral Reform, introduced the 
choice between FPTP and AV as well as other electoral reform proposals that were foreshadowed in 
the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition agreement (Renwick 2011a). My decision to pitch this 
book to publishers in the weeks after the coalition agreement was signed reflected an expectation 
that referendum campaigners would advance exaggerated and often misleading arguments, and that 
a book setting out the issues, arguments, and evidence neutrally and dispassionately might aid the 
quality of the debate. The book was written over the summer of 2010 and published in January 2011, 
four months before the referendum. 
Second, in March 2011, I produced a much shorter (10,000-word) briefing paper focusing specifically 
on the choice between FPTP and AV (Renwick 2011b). This was commissioned and published by the 
UK Political Studies Association and was intended to summarize the research evidence on key issues 
of debate in the referendum campaign. That campaign began officially on 16 February 2011, and so 
the main terms of debate were already evident when the briefing paper was planned and written. The 
intended audience was, again, journalists and members of the public. 
I shall set out to what extent and how these contributions added to the referendum discussion in the 
following section. As I indicated above, however, my interventions occurred in only one of several 
areas in which political science knowledge might have been valuable. The referendum campaign came 
at the end of the attempted reform process. Before that, political actors needed to come to a view as 
to what electoral institutions they would prefer; and they had to decide whether they wanted a 
referendum on this question at this time to occur. Ignoring these earlier stages would risk selection 
bias in our attempt to gauge the contribution that political scientists can make: if we focus only on the 
stages where we, as experts, in fact contributed, we are likely to overestimate our value in the process 
as a whole. In what follows, I therefore examine the three stages just described. These correspond to 
three of the four areas of potential contribution by political scientists: understanding of the likely 
effects of different reforms among political elites; understanding of reform processes among political 
elites; and understanding of likely reform effects among non-elites. I do not consider non-elite 
understandings of the reform process, as the decision to hold the referendum was entirely an elite 
matter. 
4 
 
 
Contributing to the Reform Debate 
Understanding of Reform Options among Political Elites 
I made no contribution to the development of understanding among political elites of the likely effects 
of different electoral reform options, nor to the parties’ decisions as to their electoral system 
preferences. Nor, to my knowledge (at least, directly) did any other political scientist. This was because 
the parties already had understandings and established preferences.  
The Liberal Democrats were (and remain) longstanding advocates of electoral reform: as the third 
party in British politics, they had suffered underrepresentation at every UK general election under 
FPTP since 1922. They knew that PR would translate votes into seats more accurately for smaller 
parties. They knew also that AV was not a proportional system. Nevertheless, they were aware that 
AV tends to benefit centrist parties that can pick up second and lower preferences, and they hoped 
that a move to AV might be a stepping stone towards deeper change. 
The Conservatives, meanwhile, were equally longstanding defenders of FPTP. Having been in 
government for longer than any other party – they were the sole governing party for fifty-one years 
of the twentieth century and partnered in government for another sixteen – they have been the 
principal beneficiaries of FPTP’s capacity (in the right circumstances) to manufacture single-party 
majorities in the legislature. Even following their crushing electoral defeats in 1997 and 2001, they 
preferred to play a long game of returning to majority power, and they knew that moving to PR would 
likely prevent that. They were worried that AV might allow the centre-left parties to coalesce more 
effectively against them, but they were willing to countenance a referendum, at least in part, because 
they saw that the effect would be limited.  
Labour has for some years been the party containing most diversity of opinion on electoral systems. 
Some prominent figures support PR, either on fairness grounds or because they see it as a mechanism 
through which a natural centre-left majority could prevent the election of Conservative governments. 
In 1997, following four successive election defeats, their manifesto pledged an inquiry, followed by a 
referendum, on PR (Labour Party 1997: 33). The party leadership have, however, consistently favoured 
majoritarian politics, and the promised referendum never materialized. Nevertheless, in 2009, 
responding to public anger over a scandal concerning MPs’ expense claims, Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown pledged that his party would call a referendum on AV after the 2010 election if it was re-
elected. The idea was to offer something that would at least appear to respond to a popular desire for 
greater accountability of MPs to their constituents while having little impact on Labour’s power 
interests. 
What is notable about each of these brief descriptions of the main parties’ thinking on electoral 
systems is that they all understood those systems’ likely effects on the distribution of power. The 
practitioners already knew what political scientists know in this regard. 
Before drawing the conclusion that political scientists have little useful to add, we can ask three 
questions. First, was there nothing about the likely effects of a shift to AV that political scientists knew 
but practitioners did not? Second, where practitioners understood electoral system effects, was this 
in fact only because they had already learnt from political scientists, such that the scholars’ role in the 
overall process remains important? Third, was this an unusual case of practitioner perspicacity, or 
does such understanding reflect a general pattern? 
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Regarding the first question, there is at least one general effect of electoral systems that political 
science research suggests practitioners often get wrong: at least in the UK, many politicians and 
journalists take it as self-evident that single-party-majority government is associated with effective 
government, especially effective economic management, whereas coalition or minority governments 
are linked to instability, indecision, and drift. Opponents of PR often cast Italy – rather than, say, 
Germany or the Netherlands – as the archetype of proportional politics. Even supporters can be 
apologetic on this point. Yet studies by political scientists and economists suggest that any economic 
effects of the electoral system are relatively small and that more proportional systems may, if 
anything, encourage faster economic growth (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 2005; Knutsen 2011). 
We can get closer to answering the second and third questions by looking deeper into the history of 
electoral reform debates in the UK beyond the AV referendum. Despite the UK’s electoral system 
stability, multiple opportunities to observe practitioners’ knowledge and understanding of electoral 
systems exist: reform of the Westminster system has been discussed for decades; away from 
Westminster, various systems have been introduced in recent years; in earlier decades, UK 
practitioners imposed or promoted particular electoral rules in numerous countries worldwide. 
We can take the best-known findings of political science as our starting point. According to Duverger’s 
laws (or Duverger’s Law and Hypothesis), plurality systems constrain the number of parties, while 
proportional systems permit (though they do not entail) a greater number of parties. Riker (1982) 
characterized these observations over thirty years ago as among the most notable examples of 
political science working well, and considerable attention has continued to be lavished upon them 
since (e.g., Amorim Neto and Cox 1997; Clark and Golder 2006). The difficulty for political scientists 
wishing to proclaim our value to the world is, however, that practitioners in the UK (as elsewhere) 
already knew these patterns before Duverger ever wrote them down and before political scientists 
conducted any sophisticated studies. Colomer’s rule – that large parties prefer majoritarian electoral 
systems while small parties prefer proportional systems (Colomer 2005: 2) – has characterized debates 
regarding the Westminster electoral system since at least the 1920s: that is why the parties have held 
the electoral system preferences briefly sketched above (for more detail, see Hart 1992; Butler 1963). 
The other principal aspect of an electoral system besides proportionality is personalization – the intra-
party dimension as opposed to the inter-party dimension. Political scientists until recently left this 
dimension largely unexplored (see, e.g., Colomer 2011; Renwick and Pilet 2016). But here too, the 
practitioners have long been ahead of us. If we look, for example, at debates over the electoral system 
for the Maltese legislature in 1920 and 1921, the British authorities advocated STV in preference to 
the list system supported by the Maltese parties on the basis that it would give voters more choice 
and more influence over who was elected and weaken the power of political parties. The Maltese 
political elite displayed equal understanding, which, combined with their different interests, led them 
to the opposite conclusions (Renwick and Pilet 2016: 83–4). 
In respect, therefore, of many of the key relationships between electoral systems and outcomes, for 
the elucidation of which much scholarly sweat has been shed, we have often done no more than 
confirm what practitioners already knew. That is not to say that political scientists have had no role in 
wider electoral reform debates in the UK. Contributions have been important, for example, in cases 
where innovative electoral rules have been devised, such as the supplementary vote system now used 
for mayoral elections (Dunleavy and Margetts 1998) and the AV+ system proposed by the 1998 Jenkins 
Commission (Independent Commission on the Voting System 1998). Political scientists have also 
provided detailed modelling of electoral system effects (e.g., Curtice and Steed 1982: 285–6; Sanders 
et al. 2011) and calculations of different forms of electoral system bias (Johnston, Rossiter, and Pattie 
2006). With regard to the big picture, however, we have good reason to show some humility. 
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Understanding of Reform Processes among Political Elites 
Political scientists were absent also from practitioners’ assessments of how the process of electoral 
reform itself might go. The proposal for a referendum on AV was hatched very rapidly in the days 
following the 2010 election in closed-door coalition negotiations among key representatives of the 
parties (Kavanagh and Cowley 2010: 225–6). Calculations of what the result of the referendum might 
be were limited to hunch rather than detailed analysis. 
In this case, it is not so clear that the practitioners knew all that political scientists could have told 
them. The Conservatives’ willingness to allow the referendum may have been based not just on the 
perception that adoption of AV would be a change they could live with, but also on the expectation 
that the bid for reform might well fail – an expectation that proved well-grounded. But the Liberal 
Democrats badly miscalculated: by losing the referendum so handsomely, they did their own 
reputation and the cause of electoral reform considerable damage. 
The question is whether the Liberal Democrats could have averted this miscalculation had they 
listened to political scientists at the time of the coalition negotiations. It is not unreasonable to say 
that they could. Political scientists have for years pointed out that major electoral reforms in 
established democracies are rare events (e.g., Nohlen 1984): reform attempts are much more likely 
to fail than to succeed. Referendum scholars, meanwhile, have pointed out that an early poll lead is 
far from guaranteeing success in the final vote (LeDuc 2002). In my own work, I have suggested there 
are two basic routes to reform: top-down elite majority imposition, when the politicians in power 
enact reform that they think will serve their interests; and bottom-up elite–mass interaction, when 
public anger over the status quo forces reluctant politicians to accept change (Renwick 2010). The 
Liberal Democrats’ reform attempt in 2010–11 fitted neither pattern. They sought reform by elite–
mass interaction. But public anger with the state of politics, though raised by the 2009 expenses 
scandal, was subsiding. More importantly, there was no convincing story as to why AV would help sort 
things out (Renwick, Lamb, and Numan 2011: 40). When voters do not see the point of a change that 
is offered to them, they tend to stick to the security of the status quo. 
Here, therefore, political scientists did know more about the dynamics of electoral reform and public 
opinion than at least some of the practitioners, and those practitioners suffered by their failure to 
listen. 
 
Understanding of Reform Options in the Wider Public 
Finally, I turn to the stage of the attempted reform process in which I did play a role: the referendum 
campaign itself. Few political scientists came out openly for one side or the other during the campaign. 
My role was that of an impartial expert, offering evidence and analysis without taking sides. My focus 
was on the practitioners of democracy broadly understood: not the politicians, but the journalists and 
ordinary members of the public. Among these groups, ignorance of the options available in the 
referendum was deep. As Vowles (2013) shows, many voters had profound misunderstandings of the 
options available to them in the referendum: more, for example, believed than disbelieved the 
statement that “AV means that some votes get counted more than others” (Vowles 2013: 221). Earlier 
research had also found common misunderstandings even of FPTP, despite its longstanding use: 
Farrell and Gallagher (1999: 300), using focus groups, found that many voters did not realize that a 
candidate could be elected under FPTP without securing an absolute majority of the vote. 
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Such ignorance was fed (often consciously) in the weeks and months before the referendum by the 
main campaign groups, which propounded numerous manifest falsehoods (Renwick and Lamb 2013). 
These falsehoods were most unabashed in the anti-AV campaign, which asserted that AV would 
violate the principle of “one person, one vote” and that its introduction would cost a sum that at least 
one leading anti-AV campaigner acknowledged was simply made up (Shackle 2011). But the pro-AV 
campaign also made false claims – for example, about the degree to which MPs were “shirking” and 
about how far AV might change this. 
Among at least some journalists, there was an appetite for the impartial expert information about the 
referendum options that the PSA briefing paper provided. That paper was referred to as a source in 
articles in the Guardian, Independent, Times, and Sunday Express newspapers, and by the FullFact and 
Channel 4 fact-checking websites. It led to my authoring articles for the Guardian, the Times, and the 
BBC News website, as well as to numerous broadcast appearances. On the other hand, this was a 
relatively low-key referendum campaign: the levels of media coverage and of turnout were far below 
those seen five years later in the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. The 
degree to which any effort emerged to debunk myths was limited. 
The extent of wider public interest in such factual information is hard to judge. Whatever its level, 
however, another issue also deserves attention: namely, that it should not be supposed that political 
scientists have a monopoly of wisdom over even citizen practitioners. My book and briefing paper 
both set out a range of criteria that might be used to judge among competing electoral systems and 
then analysed the evidence as to how each system measured up against these criteria. The briefing 
paper, for example, used six criteria that were drawn from the debate as it existed at the time: 
1. AV and the voter: does AV help voters to express themselves at the ballot box? 
2. AV and the result of the election at constituency level: does AV guarantee majority support 
for the MP elected and does it produce fair constituency results? 
3. AV and the result of the election at national level: how would AV change the balance between 
the parties and what impact would this have on the quality of government in the UK? 
4. AV and the character of politics: would AV change the nature of political discourse or the 
behaviour of MPs? 
5. the cost of AV: how much independent evidence is there on how much AV would actually cost 
to operate? 
6. AV and the future of the electoral system: would the adoption of AV make further changes to 
the electoral system thereafter more or less likely? (Renwick 2011b: 3) 
Neither the book nor the briefing paper offered any judgement as to the weight that should be 
attached to these criteria: that is a matter on which there is legitimate value disagreement. In at least 
some cases, voters’ weightings appeared to diverge from those that are often expected by political 
scientists. Notably, the academic literature tends to treat it as obvious that FPTP offers voters very 
little choice and that a preferential system such as AV would be more pleasing to citizens, in that it 
would allow them to express their preferences more fully. The AV referendum casts doubt upon that. 
The voter choice argument, though often made, had little traction, whereas the claim that FPTP gave 
voters the simple power to vote a candidate in or out held much more sway. This fits with comparative 
evidence. Political scientists tend to treat FPTP systems as offering little voter choice or 
personalization: indeed, this system is sometimes characterized as a closed-list system with a district 
magnitude of one (Carey and Shugart 1995: 425–6). Theoretically, this categorization makes perfect 
sense. But it seems voters do not perceive it that way: recent research into electoral system 
personalization in European democracies found no country using single-member districts – either to 
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elect all deputies or, as under mixed-member systems, to elect a significant proportion of them – in 
which there was any significant debate around any need for greater electoral system personalization 
(Renwick and Pilet 2016: 213). Thus, it appears that we, as political scientists, are prone to 
overestimating the degree of engagement with politics and political choices that most voters want. 
 
What Political Scientists Can Add to Electoral Reform Debates 
Three conclusions arise from these observations. First, political scientists (and other scholars) have a 
clear and important role to play in conveying understanding of electoral systems and their effects – as 
well as other building blocks of the political system – to broad publics. The political ructions of 2016 
have brought widespread talk of “post-truth politics” and scepticism towards the value of expert 
interventions in policy debates. But the work of political scientists has yielded important findings 
about how different electoral system options might contribute towards or detract from the various 
ends that people might wish to pursue. Even where practitioners know the same as we know, that we 
are able to offer rigorous, impartial evidence is important. Voters still trust and want to hear from 
academics much more than they do politicians or journalists (Ipsos MORI 2016a, 2016b). 
Second, while we do know some things about electoral reform processes and electoral system effects 
that elite practitioners do not know, much political science research has only confirmed patterns that 
practitioners were already aware of. Furthermore, even our original insights are often not really 
listened to. This suggests a need to reflect further on what we research and how we communicate our 
findings to non-academics. Careful analysis of the evidence regarding patterns that we and others 
think we already understand is, of course, important, for unrigorous perceptions can be either wrong 
or insufficiently nuanced. In addition, however, practitioners often want not ever more sophisticated 
demonstrations of general patterns that they (feel they) already understand, but, rather, something 
more specific: either technical understanding of electoral system details; or contextual understanding 
of how the general patterns are likely to play out in a particular case. Work of these kinds has relatively 
low status in contemporary political science. But we will need more of it if we wish to gain the ear of 
more practitioners. 
Third, we should remember also that learning can go both ways: practitioners can usefully learn from 
academics; but academics can also learn from practitioners, be they elite politicians, journalists, 
activists, or ordinary members of the public. In particular, while political scientists can be good at 
understanding the degree to which different options are likely to promote possible purposes, it is not 
for political scientists to dictate what those purposes should be. Most of us would, I suspect, agree 
with that and find it obvious. Yet our research is often based upon assumptions about which purposes 
in fact matter to people – assumptions that we rarely attempt to test in any depth. The failure of 
academic research to notice and attend to the full range of people’s real concerns has been a major 
topic of discussion in the wake of the Brexit referendum and the Trump election victory: this is a 
pattern that extends well beyond the study of electoral systems. 
In short, political scientists have important contributions to make. But we should pursue them in 
dialogue with others so that we understand what practitioners need. If we simply pursue our own 
research agendas and seek to impart wisdom de haut en bas, we will in fact too often deliver findings 
that practitioners find either unoriginal or irrelevant. 
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Table 
Table 1. Results of the 2010 UK general election (Great Britain only) 
 Vote share (%) Seat share (%) Seat share – Vote share 
Conservatives 37.0 48.6 +11.6 
Labour 29.7 40.8 +11.1 
Liberal Democrats 23.6 9.0 -14.6 
UK Independence Party (UKIP) 3.1 0 -3.1 
Green Party 1.0 0.2 -0.8 
Scottish Nationalists (SNP) 2.1 0.9 -1.2 
Plaid Cymru 0.7 0.5 -0.2 
Others 3.3 0.2 -3.1 
Source: Cowley and Kavanagh (2010: 352–3).  
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